Capitalism defines America. The United States was founded on capitalism and has stood by it throughout the course of history. The story of the first transcontinental railroad, not surprisingly, was also born of capitalism. Four books by Oscar Lewis, Wesley Griswold, Robert Athearn and David Haward Bain explain that the building of this iron line connecting the Atlantic and Pacific coasts was a prime example of a negative aspect of capitalism, the greed and callousness of those whose sole aim is the accumulation of money. Yet the efforts of such money-hungry tyrants, these books agree, built a transportation breakthrough that revolutionized commerce and transportation, forever changing life in the American West.
The four major owners of the Central Pacific Railroad (CP), Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, Mark Hopkins and Charles Crocker, created “perhaps the nation’s choicest example of a complete and sustained monopoly,” by controlling most of the economic resources of one sixth of the nation’s area.(Lewis, 365) Despite their contributions to the West’s economic history, no formal biography of any of the partners existed until 1938 when Lewis decided to place their stories in an all-inclusive volume, entitled The Big Four. Lewis’ goal was to write a balanced account of the CP directors. Lewis felt everything written about the CP before his book was extremely biased. Some books supported the railroad while others vehemently opposed it. For the most part, Lewis presents an unbiased look at the making of the Pacific railway, emphasizing the roles of the CP directors and providing thoughtful insight into each of their characters.
The preface of Griswold’s book, A Work of Giants, written in 1961, explains that the Southern Pacific (formerly the CP) and the Union Pacific (UP), at the time of writing, were well respected, prosperous and efficient. However, Griswold later contends that their “ancestors often represented the antithesis of those qualities.”(Griswold, xi) Throughout his narrative Griswold illustrates time and time again that those ‘ancestors’ had their minds and hearts set on one thing: turning a quick and bounteous profit. Unyielding self-confidence and indefatigable determination assisted the early directors of both railroads in achieving the goal of immense wealth, despite perilous financial straits early on and continued opposition from critics in government and media.
Lewis and Griswold’s books view the history of the first transcontinental railroad in terms of the top executives who managed the two competing railroads. In contrast, Athearn’s Union Pacific Country, completed in 1971, traces the story from the view of the ordinary people whose concerns and opinions are voiced in contemporary newspapers. Athearn adds another layer to the saga, largely omitted in previous scholarship, by explaining the public’s perceptions of the railroad while also detailing everyday life at the UP’s railhead in Omaha and the dangers of early train travel in the frontier West.
In 1999 David Haward Bain wrote Empire Express, which is easily the most detailed account of the first transcontinental railroad’s history. His research is exhaustive. With 711 pages, delving through the entire volume is no small feat, even for one who is extremely interested in the subject. One of Bain’s strengths is his broad use of personal narratives, which add depth as well as glimpses into the character of the key railroad players. Another strength is Bain’s interjection of humor, which lightens up his narrative.
Lewis’ account is organized into sections describing the life, contributions and character of Theodore Judah, a young engineer whose vision was the impetus for the CP, as well as short biographies of the Big Four and a later investor, David Colton. The final two sections describe what travel was like in the railroad’s early years and explain how the four built their monopoly. Knowing that the volume was written nearly 65 years ago may discourage some modern readers, but Lewis’ style presents the story in an understandable and descriptive format.
The author begins by tracing the career of Theodore Judah, the optimistic young engineer who surveyed a route for the transcontinental line through the Sierra Nevadas while the Big Four were still modest shopkeepers in Sacramento. At first, many thought Judah was a madman and many would-be stockholders resisted his appeals to purchase shares in the fledgling enterprise. After failing to generate interest in San Francisco, whose business community considered ships and not trains as its main vehicle of commerce, Judah headed to Sacramento where he convinced local capitalists that the railroad would be their panacea. Lewis argues that the Central Pacific Railroad emanated from the Big Four’s desire to make a large and quick return on their investment.
In the book’s first section, Lewis portrays Judah as a hero who did not receive the credit he so sorely deserved. The Big Four presents Judah as a man determined to safeguard his project from the shortsighted actions of money-hungry tyrants. After butting heads with the Big Four on numerous occasions, Judah retired as chief engineer and planned a takeover of the CP using the wealth of Cornelius Vanderbilt and other capitalists. Judah, however, died of yellow fever in Panama on his way to court these investors in Boston and New York. Unfortunately, no one credited Judah when the Golden Spike was driven in Promontory at the May 10, 1869 ceremony.
The Big Four’s obsession with cutting costs wherever possible led them to ignore Judah’s sound recommendations and make construction decisions without him. They appointed themselves as sole contractors and “moved” the base of the Sierra Nevadas 25 miles west by justifying to the government that a different type of soil marked the beginning of the mountain range, where the government subsidies doubled.
Competition to beat the Union Pacific to Nevada’s silver mines resulted in hasty, shoddy construction. A friend of Crocker’s concluded that had speed not been a factor, the costs of building could have been reduced by 70 percent.(Lewis, 85) Construction might have been faster and cheaper if it had ceased during the winter, when the line only gained inches per day. In addition, there would have been fewer worker casualties. After the Union Pacific and Central Pacific met at Promontory, building crews stayed on the payroll to complete repairs on the track already laid – repairs needed due to the hastiness of construction.(Lewis, 104)
The CP’s rapid and shoddy construction is well known, but Griswold and Athearn fail to present the UP side of the matter. “In the name of speed” Grenville Dodge, UP chief engineer, had to lay track on steep grades of 116 feet to the mile, the maximum allowable by law, and avoid expensive and time-consuming rock cutting wherever possible.(Bain, 376) Dodge, depicted as a main of integrity in scholarship before Bain’s volume, vehemently opposed this decision but adhered to it because he had to choose other battles to fight. One of those battles was with Iowa constituents he represented as congressman, a post he never desired but to which he was elected because of his popularity. Dodge excused himself from meetings in Washington by saying he had to go to the Rocky Mountains to recover from a war wound. This attitude exhibits a departure from the upstanding man portrayed in earlier volumes.
Dodge was one UP director who lauded the CP’s use of Chinese labor. Lewis’ book recognizes the vital role the Chinese played in the railroad’s construction. Crocker, the CP’s construction manager, respected the Chinese because of the superior service rendered by his servant Ah Ling and was instrumental in convincing his three partners to use Chinese labor, despite the opposition of racists and white unions. Dodge complimented the “docile industry” of the Chinese laborers and disparaged his own ex-soldiers for distinguishing themselves in “qualities far removed from docility.”(Lewis, 93) However Lewis, through his rhetoric, shows he views the Chinese as inferior when he describes relations between the Chinese and their white counterparts, remarking, “The superiority of the Caucasian was undiminished, his dignity enhanced.”(Lewis, 72)
Griswold also mentions the disharmony that abounded following the “Big Four’s” decision to utilize Chinese laborers as the principle workforce on the groundbreaking transportation enterprise. Leland Stanford, former California governor and long-standing CP president, like the print media of the day, was an outspoken critic of the Chinese before the resolution to employ them. Anti-Chinese sentiment soared in both the press and among California’s voting public. Stanford changed his stance on the issue, as did many other detractors, once he saw how dependable the workers from the Far East were compared to their white or Irish counterparts. Chinese laborers proved themselves in diligence and teachability. In addition, they avoided whiskey, fights and unionization.(Griswold, 121) Griswold compliments the Chinese workforce. Though they were subordinates to Irish foremen, he notes that they were even respected the one time they went on strike. Charley Crocker, CP director and construction supervisor, later said that in a strike white laborers would have been prone to murder and drunkenness, but the Chinese, in contrast, stayed in their camps and instigated no violence.(Ibid, 197)
Bain describes the Chinese as “ant-like.” He takes a humorous approach to the subject, explaining the CP saw good reason to hire “Chinamen” as masons, remarking, “Didn’t they build the wall?”(Bain, 221) According to Bain, the Chinese worked for other railroads previous to their contributions to the CP, a fact that prior volumes omit. Lewis and Griswold give the impression that the Big Four hatched the idea of utilizing Far East labor.
In general, Lewis considers the Big Four as ruthless tyrants bent on fattening coffers regardless of the consequences. The book portrays Mark Hopkins as the anomaly of the group, explaining, “the role of capitalist made him faintly uncomfortable.”(Lewis, 127) Hopkins was the most conservative of all. Indeed, his growing wealth hardly changed his habits. Due to his lifelong hatred of waste, Hopkins lived in a rented cottage while Stanford and Crocker built extravagant mansions. Only later did Hopkins build a similar dwelling and only then to please his social-conscious wife. Fittingly, Hopkins never lived in the mansion because he died before its completion. News accounts of his death described him as the most likable of the associates, with none of the vanity and little of the ruthlessness exhibited by his partners.
Lewis depicts Huntington as the ruthless genius behind the operation. He set prices not by what an article cost him, but by how badly his customer wanted it.(Ibid, 221) One writer called him “scrupulously dishonest.”(Ibid, 211) He was anything but a philanthropist. Under his control, the traveling public was not pampered.(Ibid, 218) Early on, while the Union Pacific adopted Pullmans, then the most state-of-the-art, comfortable railroad car, the CP retained the sub-standard “Silver Palace” models, whose brand name was the only good thing about them.(Ibid, 339) Huntington’s egoism and greed was obvious when he said the quality he most admired about himself was his ability to make an investment turn a profit.(Ibid, 220)
Making a profit was Stanford’s obsession. According to Lewis, he loved making money almost as much as he did spending it. At Stanford’s death, the university erected in the memory of his son almost folded because of his reckless expenditures. As president of the company the first 28 years and as governor of California, Stanford was largely a figurehead who enjoyed the spotlight but was easily outmaneuvered. He served more or less as the public relations representative of the railroad. According to Lewis, Crocker was also a subordinate, a man best suited for taking orders. Crocker supervised the actual construction and sold his stock two years after 1869 because he did not want to be confined to an office. The volume casts Huntington as the dominating figure of the eventual monopolistic “octopus” that tightened its grip on California and much of the 1870s West while Hopkins contented himself with keeping the accounts.(Lewis, 167)
Griswold discusses how pre-CP companies feared the nascent railroad would ruin monopolies they had already established. For example, the Sacramento Valley Railroad (SVRR) unabashedly spread scandalous lies about its impending competitor.(Griswold, 30) Later, the SVRR spread a rumor that CP directors only planned to build as far as Dutch Flat, a town 70 miles east of Sacramento. The gossip delayed bonds from San Francisco, but fortunately for Huntington and his CP counterparts, the libelous material did not dissuade other sources of much-needed financial help. Upon the railroad’s completion, the more robust version of the CP did destroy prior monopolies and formed its own monopoly that went unrivaled for more than fifty years.
Like the CP, monetary help came slowly for the UP directors, who had only laid a mile and a half of track until brothers Oakes and Oliver Ames provided unmarred credibility, and most importantly, indispensable financial backing for the struggling corporation. The UP desperately needed a good reputation because it was in the incapable hands of Thomas C. Durant, a former doctor turned speculator who Griswold depicts as all show and no substance. Durant’s shaky leadership was obvious as he tried to hire Dodge as chief engineer before the UP was even a corporation, assured potential UP investors the enterprise had money when it did not, and unnecessarily lengthened the distance of the railroad to grab more government subsidies, among other ills. Durant constantly bickered with other UP management. For instance, he delighted in making appearances that other directors despised. However, in one instance his showmanship proved beneficial. Durant’s extravagant celebration held when the UP reached the 100th meridian, 247 miles west of its terminus in Omaha, generated favorable publicity and facilitated the sale of more company bonds.(Griswold, 185) Despite this lone positive outcome of a Durant idea, Griswold portrays the UP director as a railroad villain, an unmatched example of unscrupulousness. Durant’s sole aim, according to Griswold, was to earn a huge profit in building the railroad then sell out when it was completed and let someone else experience the repercussions of his mismanagement.
Empire Express portrays Durant as a scoundrel also. The volume strongly emphasizes the infighting in the UP boardroom, usually caused by Durant. Bain draws further attention to Durant’s sketchy dealings by detailing lawsuits Durant filed that impeded construction and ill-advised high-interest loans he endorsed. Durant enjoyed “poisoning” reputations for his personal gain and made scenes at directors’ meetings when he did not get what he wanted. With a touch of hilarity, Bain illustrates how UP workers felt about Durant. When laying out the streets of Cheyenne, Wyoming, UP surveyors, under Dodge’s supervision, named a street after nearly every director, except Durant.(Bain, 373)
In contrast to the UP, A Work of Giants generally depicts the CP directors’ relationship as harmonious, mainly because they were so anxious to succeed.(Griswold, 88) The CP backers all had specific jobs and little “comradely” feeling toward on another, but they had a mutual trust, which proved necessary since during most of their early tenure Huntington remained in New York ordering necessary supplies and constantly lobbying for Eastern financial backers. Though the book’s tone is generally favorable towards the CP, it does touch on the firm’s more underhanded dealings, such as bribing newspaper reporters for favorable press by giving them CP stock and charging it to the construction account.
While other volumes are weak in explaining the two competing railroads’ bribery and espionage, Empire Express is not. It mentions Huntington’s attempts to plant spies around UP directors, such as in the form one of the competing line’s attorneys, dangling a gift of $20,000 worth of CP stock.(Bain, 393) Bain also offers a more detailed account the UP’s bribery of many influential senators and congressional representatives, which later led to the Credit Mobilier Scandal.
While Athearn is relatively mute on corruption in the two railroad companies, he adds important details in other aspects of first transcontinental line’s construction. For instance, he details the widespread popular misunderstandings regarding the route’s geography. Many Americans thought the Intermountain West and high plains was an uninhabitable desert. Skeptics argued that only the government could build such an unprofitable road. “This now-pessimistic, now optimistic view of the Great Plains that so sharply underscored the American public’s suspicion and ignorance of the country,” Athearn noted, “deeply concerned supporters of the Union Pacific project.”(Athearn, 33) According the author, the barriers perceived by potential investors were purely psychological and caused by an idealistic view of the land the UP would later develop.
Fortunately for UP directors, pessimism turned to optimism. As the UP ventured deeper into Nebraska, misconceptions about the land subsided and the general public eagerly anticipated how the iron horse would transform their lives. Bayard Taylor, a well-known traveler, author and lecturer of the day, predicted the influence of the road in promoting settlement would be more appreciated as it approached completion.(Ibid, 43) Taylor’s prophecy held true. As the UP advanced west of Omaha, the nation increasingly recognized the benefits of locomotive travel, foreseeing cheaper shipping costs of all necessary goods and a means to visit relatives in the East. Soon the nation took a nationalistic view of the railroad, perceiving it as a public necessity that would bind the nation together. By 1869, to criticize or oppose the enterprise was almost unpatriotic.(Athearn, 56)
Omaha newspapers touted the railroad as a “pinnacle of fortune” that would expand the West’s population and be the “almoner of prosperity.”(Ibid, 38) One job advertisement in an Omaha newspaper boasted “good wages will be given,” an attraction many could not pass up, an attraction that made Omaha similar to any “terminopolis” whose population suddenly exploded.(Ibid, 39) Later terminus towns like Laramie and Cheyenne, Wyoming, experience lawlessness and debauchery that gave them the nickname “hell on wheels.” Prostitution and shootings commonly occurred in towns such as North Platte, Nebraska and Julesburg, Colorado. Although permanent settlers and UP laborers brawled regularly, violence did not dominate the scene. The UP encouraged political organization in the towns it spawned, Athearn attests. For example, UP surveyors laid out Cheyenne in July, 1867. Citizens of the future capital of Wyoming elected a mayor and councilmen by August. Mormons were especially disgusted by the wickedness that railroad workmen brought, but were relieved that such corruption dissipated once the tracks were completely laid.
Athearn ably covers the Mormon viewpoint on the railroad’s construction. Earlier volumes largely ignore how the enterprise influenced Utahns. Athearn traces how the national prejudice against the Mormons convinced many Gentiles that the Saints would resist the project. Responding to such negativity, the Deseret News, the Salt Lake newspaper, felt it needed to continuously assure the Utah population that the railroad would be a benefit the territory. Later, while building the Utah Central Railroad, a connector to the transcontinental line, Mormons fully realized the advantages of rails and felt they were building the railroad “for the kingdom.”(Athearn, 266) Of course, the railroad was a boon to Utah. It softened preconceived notions about Mormonism as travelers from the East were more easily able to reach the largest settlement between Omaha and San Francisco and see that it was in good order.(Ibid, 83) Brigham Young, president of the Mormon Church, viewed grading contracts awarded to his people by the UP as a godsend to the territory’s economy.(Ibid, 91) Athearn even attributes the birth of Utah’s important department store, the Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institution, to financial encouragement from the railroad.(Ibid, 79)
Sections of Leonard Arrington’s book Great Basin Kingdom explain the Mormon viewpoint in greater detail than the four other volumes. Arrington indicates that, contrary to the popular belief of the time, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints advocated the building of the transcontinental railroad. The Utah Territorial Legislature sent a memo to Congress asking consideration for a railroad to the Pacific Coast in 1852.(Arrington, 236) Brigham Young, president of the church, said that Mormonism would be a poor religion if it could not stand one railroad.(Ibid, 237) Few statements from church leaders or Utah media expressed downright displeasure against the project. The church welcomed the trains, but deplored some of their consequences, such as riffraff workers and the effects upon Utah’s economy.
One reason the church looked favorably upon the railroad was its cheaper, faster and easier means of bringing converts to the Utah oasis. The iron horse also provided positive public relations for the once-isolated Mormon enclave, which much of the nation viewed in a negative light before the railroad’s emergence. Grading contracts, some argued, would show that LDS members were patriotic and interested in “consummating this great national good.”(Ibid, 262) Arrington notes that Brigham Young hailed the railroad grading contracts as a godsend that pumped vital cash into the Utah economy, though he feared its other economic consequences. Mormon leaders tried to engage in a moral sanction against the importation of “wasteful commodities” such as liquor, tobacco, fashionable clothing and elegant furniture.(Arrington, 240) The church hierarchy also feared that cheap imports would destroy local industry, take away money from Mormons, put more specie in the pockets of non-Mormon merchants, and promote local unemployment. For example, Young feared that cheaper food from the Midwest would undersell Utah-produced fare because the Midwestern victuals did not carry the added expense of irrigation.
Arrington adds further depth to the Mormon perception of the railroad by chronicling the efforts of the School of the Prophets, whose activities are not often mentioned in other scholarship detailing the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad. The School acted as a Ku Klux Klan-like organization that policed the virtue of the territorial population. The group sought to minimize the influx of those who might threaten community morals. Such attempts to protect inhabitants’ values led to the signing of the grading contracts, a measure the School hoped would eliminate the importation of more raucous laborers.(Ibid, 246) The School also sought to discourage Gentile settlers by undervaluing Utah’s mineral wealth and criticizing Mormon suppliers who refused to patronize local enterprises. To avoid this problem, the church tried to channel all vital imports through its own wholesale trader, ZCMI, and boycotted Gentile businesses and trading establishments.(Ibid, 248)
All five books present valuable insights into the building of the first transcontinental railroad. However, each volume has weakness. Lewis, because the book was written in 1938, bows to the sensational, yellow-journalistic information by devoting too much space to the trivial matters surrounding the four partners’ private lives, which bare little on railroad matters. Perhaps also he is too swept away by the anti-business sentiment of New Deal America, which blamed Wall Street and corporate greed for The Great Depression. Whatever the case, Lewis’ book is overwritten and too detailed. A shorter volume would have been even more effective. Nevertheless, Lewis’ account is highly critical, even to the point of suggesting the role of railroad builders was one that none of them deserved. On the other hand, Lewis balances his portrayal by crediting the Big Four with having “accomplished the most momentous engineering and financial feat of their generation.”(Lewis, 283)
Financial stimulation is where Union Pacific Country proves monolithic. Throughout his narrative, Athearn views the railroad as the sole harbinger of economic progress in the West. It was a major contributor, but not the only contributor. The book is also monolithic in that it hardly mentions the role of the Central Pacific.
One might also fault Athearn’s statement that the nation “gladly” turned its attention to the building of the transcontinental railroad after the Civil War.(Athearn, 16) This declaration contradicts his later emphasis on the pessimism with which Americans viewed the project and the Union Pacific’s difficulty in convincing potential investors to purchase its stock. The UP looked doomed after it had only laid a mile and a half of track and was only bailed out of financial crisis by the Ames brothers, Oakes and Oliver, famous shovel manufacturers from Boston, who, along with other Boston elite, invested nearly $5 million in the struggling railroad. But, even this money quickly ran out. Athearn again contradicts himself only four pages later when he asserts that, “The ensuing reluctance of investors to participate in the great national enterprise probably came as no surprise to those who went west by wagon in 1862.”(Ibid, 21) Athearn would have been better off had he omitted such a statement and let his narrative tell the reader that attitudes toward the railroad grew more positive as construction progressed.
Many readers might roll their eyes after reading the introduction’s claim that the book strives for “as much objectivity as possible.”(Ibid, 17) Athearn demonstrates his failure to learn the first rule of feature newspaper reporting: show, don’t tell. By emphasizing his objectivity, Athearn makes many readers skeptical from the beginning and take his narrative lightly. Instead he should display his objectivity with detailed, well-balanced text. Still, however, Union Pacific Country is balanced history of the railroad directors, their workers and other people and industries the railroad affected.
While Griswold emphasizes the valuable contributions of Chinese workers, he largely eliminates the viewpoint of railroad workers. The volume is written too much from the perspective of management. Griswold’s book should have included more of the commoners’ standpoint. The absence of such a point of view, however, cannot be blamed entirely on Griswold, but on the lack of source material. Many laborers were illiterate and most of literate employees probably did not keep a diary. In addition, during that time period, workers’ opinions were not highly respected. Not until the emergence of oral history in the latter 20th century were inferiors’ opinions reported and even considered significant. Griswold’s prose, and any history before the end of the 1900s, would be more informative and less biased if tape recorders would have been available.
Despite this weakness, A Work of Giants is enlightening and suitable for any booklover. It fully describes the building of the first transcontinental railroad and includes anecdotal stories that contribute a more humanistic dimension to the narrative. Interestingly, Griswold was not a professional historian. He was an editor for Popular Science magazine who became obsessed with the story of the first transcontinental railroad. His findings contribute to further scholarship on the subject. In particular, Griswold’s entertaining and informative volume correctly credits capitalism with being the driving force behind this engineering marvel and the development of the nation.
Arrington’s position as director of Brigham Young University’s prestigious Charles Redd Center has both advantages and disadvantages. With his access to church sources, Arrington provides greater detail about how the transcontinental railroad influenced Utah than previous works. However, his membership in the church also makes him view the events with an uncommonly positive bias. After reading this section, one might think Mormons can do little wrong and that any trial that comes their way is not their fault, but the fault of outside forces. Nonetheless, Great Basin Kingdom provides much needed insight on the inner-workings of the early Latter-day Saint economy not seen in other volumes.
Bain’s descriptions of railroad finances are cryptic, even for the most fiscal savvy readers. He concentrates too much text on the boardroom and not enough on the grader or tracklayer. The text is choppy, at times reaching a climax on one event then inserting a section break to move onto another. For example, on page 428 Bain mentions the CP needed to hire an assistant superintendent as a “trainmaster,” but never tells whom the directorate hired. The next paragraph talks about how heavy snowfall stopped progression of the work in the Sierra Nevadas. In short, Bain adds too much detail to his narrative. Much of the material he includes is not seen in other scholarship, but for good reason. Most of it is purely anecdotal and has little bearing on railroad matters.
Unlike many important aspects of American history such as slavery, Progressivism, and Populism, the historiography of the first transcontinental railroad derived from these five volumes differs little in interpretation. Most differences from one book to another are simply in the authors’ decisions of what to include and what to omit. However, the volumes do differ in the way they see the character of the major players in the railroad’s construction. For instance, some authors laud Dodge as impeccable, while others show readers he was just as dishonest as the next manager, if he chose to be. All volumes agree Durant was the most ignoble and Hopkins the most affable. Griswold’s account is the most enjoyable and succinctly presents the story. Of the books described A Work of Giants should be the first choice of readers newly interested in the capitalistic venture that forever bound the nation together.
Arrington, Leonard J. Great Basin Kingdom: Economic History of the Latter-Day Saints1830-1900. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 1966. 534 Pp.
Athearn, Robert G. Union Pacific Country. New York: Rand McNally. 1971. 480 Pp.
Bain, David H. Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad. New York: Penguin. 1999. 797 Pp.
Griswold, Wesley S. A Work of Giants: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1962. 367 Pp.
Lewis, Oscar. The Big Four: The Story of Huntington, Stanford, Hopkins and Crocker and the Building of the Central Pacific. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1938.